Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1986

Miner v. Miner : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B.L.Dart, Jr.; Dart, Adamson & Parken; Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent.
David S. Dolowitz; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Miner v. Miner, No. 860226 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/114

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOC*. ...-.iT
KFU
50

^ et>ozzc>

./

L

c;

nw,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

£6a^6 -<?>?•

DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 8603^
Priority 13(b)

v.
CAROL JEAN MINER,
Defendant and
Respondent.
oooOooo

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the T!tiird District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Dean E. Condor Presiding

B. L.l Dart
John p. Parken
DART J ADAMSON & PARKEN
Suite 1330, 310 South Main
Salt |Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent

David S. Dolowitz
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

N0V171986
Clark Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 86039
Priority 13(b)

v.
CAROL JEAN MINER,
Defendant and
Respondent.
oooOooo

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Presiding

B. L. Dart
John D. Parken
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN
Suite 1330, 310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent

David S. Dolowitz
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

NATURE OF CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I
DR. MINER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

9

DR. MINER WAS BOUND BY THE PRIOR DENIAL OF
HIS MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SO AS TO DIVIDE THE EQUITY EQUALLY . . .

14

THE MODIFICATION SOUGHT BY DR. MINER WOULD BE
UNFAIR AND INEQUITABLE

18

POINT II

POINT III

CONCLUSION

19

i

CASES CITED
Page
Anderson v. Anderson
13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962)

16

Chandler v. West
610 P. 2d 1299 (Utah 1980)

11, 12

Drury v. Lunceford
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 (1966)

17

Klein v. Klein
544 P. 2d 472 (Utah 1975)

16

Land v. Land
605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)

12

Stettler v. Stettler
713 P. 2d 699 (Utah 1985)

10

Trego v. Trego
565 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1977)

16

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.

Case No. 86039

CAROL JEAN MINER,
Priority 13(b)
Defendant and
Respondent.
oooOooo

RESPONDENT'S BRIEf

STATEMENT OF ISSU?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing
to modify a fixed-sum equity awarded to the wife in the parties'
former residence by using those funds to satisfy an alleged but
unliquidated and unproven tax liability resulting from the
disallowance by the IRS of a tax shelter acquired by the husband
during the marriage?
NATURE OF CASE
This is a domestic relations action in which the
physician-husband appeals from the denial of his second motion to
modify the property distribution.

The parties were divorced in

1982 and their assets were subsequently divided.

The property

distribution awarded the parties1 residence to the husband with a
fixed-sum equity interest requiring four equal annual payments to
the wife.
In 1985, the husband left the state, necessitating the
sale of the residence, and failed to make the first annual equity
payment.

He moved to have the fixed-sum equity interest modified

to an equal share in the equity.

The motion was denied.

He did

not appeal.
By 1986, the husband was deliquent in two annual
installments and the house had been sold.

He again moved to

modify the fixed-sum equity interest to allow the payment of
joint obligations, including an alleged tax deficiency, with the
remaining equity being distributed equally.
denied.

His motion was again

He appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties1 marriage was terminated by an original

Decree of Divorce entered on February 29, 1984, which reserved
for later trial, inter alia, the property distribution issue.
(R. at 329-31, infra at A-2 through A-4.)

Following a trial on

May 21 and 22, 1984, the Honorable Dean E. Conder entered a Memorandum Decision on June 5, 1984 (R. at 380-83), and, ultimately,
entered a Supplemental Decree of Divorce on August 23, 1984
(R. at 397-402, infra at A-5 through A-10).
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That Decree awarded Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas Lee
Miner (hereinafter "Dr. Miner") possession and ownership of the
parties' residence subject to an equity interest in DefendantRespondent Carol Jean Miner (hereinafter "Mrs. Miner").

(See,

Supplemental Decree, paragraphs 5, 7, and 14, R. at 397-402.)
Judge Conder found (Findings, paragraph 6, R. at 387-88, that the
residence had a net equity at the time of trial of $135,356.00
and fixed Mrs. Miner's equity interest in the home at $67,500.00,
requiring Dr. Miner to pay this amount in four equal annual
installments of $16,875.00 with interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum.

(Memorandum Decision, R. at 382 and

Supplemental Decree at paragraph 14, R. at 401.)

Payments were

to be made on June 1 of each year, beginning in 1985.

(Id.)

Judge Conder found that Dr. Miner, a physician, earned
$139,104.00 in 1983 (Findings, paragraph 10, R. at 388) and
ordered Dr. Miner to pay alimony of $1,000.00 per month for 24
months and then $500.00 per month for an additional 24 months.
(Supplemental Decree, paragraph 13, R. at 401.)

The trial court

also divided the parties' personal property, ordered Dr. Miner to
pay Mrs. Miner $1,000.00 per month beginning June 1, 1988, until
the sum of $67,678.00 (representing one-half of the parties'
profit sharing account) had been paid with interest at ten

3

percent (10%) per annum, and distributed to Dr. Miner stocks
and securities having a value of approximately $150,000.00.
Dr. Miner took no appeal from the Decree of Divorce.
Dr. Miner failed to make the first annual equity
payment on June 1, 1985, and Mrs. Miner moved for the entry of
Judgment.

(R. at 426.)

On June 21, 1985, Judge Conder entered

an Order resolving several disputes betweem the parties and
providing that, in the event of the sale of the residence awarded
to Dr. Miner, all of the installments due on Mrs. Miner's
$67,500.00 equity interest would be paid and that her interest
would constitute a lien on the property.
R. at 433, infra at A-14.)
Order.

(Order, paragraph 3(b),

Dr. Miner took no appeal from that

The parties stipulated that Mrs. Miner's motion for

Judgment on the delinquent installment be continued until August
5, 1985.

(R. at 435.)
A few days later, on July 8, 1985, Dr. Miner moved

to amend the original property distribution so that Mrs. Miner's
interest in the equity of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner
would be one-half of the net sales proceeds rather than the
fixed amount originally awarded by Judge Conder.
R. at 438-439, infra at A-16 through A-17.)

(Motion,

This Motion was

heard, together with Mrs. Miner's Motion for Judgment on the
delinquent equity payment, by Domestic Relations Commissioner
Sandra Peuler, who recommended that Dr. Miner's Motion for
4

Modification be denied and Mrs. Miner be awarded judgment for the
delinquent equity payment.

(R. at 450.)

Dr. Miner rejected the

Commissioner's recommendation (R. at 455) and the matter was
heard by Judge Conder, who denied Dr. Miner's Motion for
Modification (Order, R. at 461-62, infra at A-18 through A-19)
and granted Mrs. Miner judgment for the delinquent equity payment
(Judgment, R. at 459-60).

Dr. Miner did not appeal.

Almost a year later, and by then also delinquent on
the second annual equity installment, Dr. Miner again moved to
modify the fixed-amount equity interest awarded to Mrs. Miner in
the original property distribution, this time couching his motion
in terms of "relief from judgment" under Rule 60(b) (7) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A-20 through A-23.)

(Motion, R. at 463-65, infra, at

Dr. Miner based his motion upon the fact

that the sale of the home had produced approximately $30,000.00
less than anticipated at the entry of the original property
distribution and upon the allegation that the IRS had, in the
meantime, determined that "Geothermal Partners II," in which
Dr. Miner had invested as a tax shelter, had been determined by
the IRS to be a sham, supposedly resulting in the disallowance of
deductions for the tax year 1981 and the imposition of additional
tax for that year in the approximate amount of $20,000.00. (Id.)
Additionally, in his Affidavit in support of his motion,
Dr. Miner speculated that additional deductions taken for the tax
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years 1982 and 1983 would also be disallowed.

(Affidavit,

paragraph 7, R. at 532-35.)
In response to Dr. Miner's motion, Mrs. Miner pointed
out that Dr. Miner had failed to present to the Court appropriate
evidence in support of his claims and that the incomplete copies
of IRS materials submitted did "not establish what the ultimate
tax consequence of the IRS's position will be."
R. at 543-46.)

(Reply, page 3,

Mrs. Miner also sought an Order of the Court

directing the payment from the sales proceeds of the residence of
the full amount of her fixed-sum equity interest together with
accrued interest (Motion, R. at 540-42) or, in the alternative,
Judgment for the second delinquent installment (Motion,
R. at 558-59) .
A hearing on these motions was held before Judge
Conder on June 12, 1986.
R. at 586-604.)

(See, generally. Transcript,

At that hearing, Dr. Miner called no witnesses,

submitted no evidence, and made no proffers of proof.

It was

acknowledged, however, that neither of the two delinquent equity
installments had been paid.

Counsel for Mrs. Miner pointed out

to Judge Conder that there was no real evidence as to what the
IRS might ultimately do with the disallow€>d 1981 deduction,
noting that even though disallowed in 1981, it might be possible
to take the deduction for the 1982 or 1983 tax year.
(Transcript, R. at 597-98.)

Having heard the arguments of
6

counsel for both parties, Judge Conder wisely noted that the
value of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner
could have gone up, or it could go down.
I take it as to what I have to work on at the
time and I made that distribution and that
division of the equity. I'm going to stand on
that, for whatever payment the doctor was
obligated to make under the terms of that
equity. . . .

As to the tax liability, I think it would
be a horrendous obligation at this time to try
to decide who has got what taxes to pay.
Transcript of Hearing, R. at 599-600. Judge Conder thus
determined that the IRS, not the state court, should
determine which of the parties was responsible for any tax
liability ultimately and finally found to be owing. A
written Order was entered denying Dr. Miner's motion for
modification.

(R. at 571-73, infra at A-29 through A-31.)

Dr. Miner appealed.

(R. at 578-79.)

At Dr. Miner's request, Judge Conder stayed
execution on any of the prior judgments and placed a portion
of the sales proceeds of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner
in an interest-bearing trust account pending the resolution
of this Appeal.

(Order, R. at 562-63A.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
—

Modification of property distributions

as opposed to alimony and support awards —

should be

made with reluctance and only where clearly necessitated by
the circumstances.

The trial court's grant or denial of

modification of a property distribution is viewed with great
deference and will be reversed on appeal only if constituting an abuse of discretion or misapplication of relevant
law.

Dr. Miner failed to present any substantial evidence

to the trial court in support of his request for modification and the trial courtfs denial of that modification,
therefore, cannot be reversed on appeal.
POINT II: By the time the trial court denied
Dr. Miner's second request for modification, from which he
now appeals, Dr. Miner was delinquent on both the first and
second annual installment on Mrs. Miner's fixed-sum equity
position in the residence that had been awarded to
Dr. Miner.

Both of Dr. Miner's motions for modification

were prompted by his delinquency in the required installments and both sought to modify the original Decree so as to
distribute equally the equity in the residence.

Having

failed to appeal from the first denial of his motion,
Dr. Miner should not now be heard to complain of the denial
of his subsequent motion.

8

POINT III: The modification sought by Dr. Miner
was unfair and unwarranted by the circumstances.

Not only

was the claimed tax obligation hypothetical in nature
because no final determination had been made by the IRS, but
also, if such an obligation arises, it will be because of
the IRS's determination that the tax shelter "invested" in
by Dr. Miner is a sham.

During the marriage, Dr. Miner

handled all of the financial affairs of the parties and did
not consult with Mrs. Miner in connection with the investment he now claims may ultimately expose both parties to a
joint obligation to the IRS. Having selected the investment
from which the joint obligation may arise, Dr. Miner should
not be permitted to satisfy that joint obligation out of
property awarded to Mrs. Miner.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DR. MINER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO

WARRANT MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION.
As the Appellant appealing from the District
Court's refusal to modify a property distribution, Dr. Miner
faces a very heavy burden. While divorce actions are
equitable in nature, this Court has consistently adhered to
the firmly established principle that the trial courtfs
decisions are to be accorded a great deal of deference and

9

will not be reversed on appeal absent some clear showing of
an abuse of discretion or misapplication of relevant law.
This Court's decision in Stettler v. Stettler,
713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985), is typical of the many cases
recognizing, and according great deference to, the trial
court's advantaged position to review and determine the
respective rights of the parties in domestic relations
matters.

In Stettler, the wife was awarded a fixed-amount

equity interest in the parties' residence, which was to be
paid upon the sale of the home or the attainment by the
youngest child of the age of 18 years. The home was awarded
to the husband.

Following the divorce, both parties re-

married and the wife left the state.

She petitioned for

modification, seeking an immediate payment of her equity so
as to be able to provide a proper home for her children when
they visited.

This Court noted that while the modification

of a divorce Decree was a matter of equity
the Court accords considerable deference
to the judgment of the trial court. Its
judgment will not be disturbed unless the
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary
or unless the trial court abuses its discretion
or misapplies principles of law.
713 P.2d at 701 (emphasis added, footnote citations
omitted).

Accordingly, by the standard set forth by this
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Court in one of the cases upon which he relies, Dr. Miner
faces a very heavy burden in this appeal.
Moreover, it is significant to note that the
modification sought by Dr. Miner in this case was of the
property distribution rather than the alimony or support
provisions of the original Decree.

In one of the cases upon

which Dr. Miner himself relies, Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d
1299 (Utah 1980), this Court held that:
[P]roperty settlements are entitled to a
greater sanctity than alimony and support
payments in proceedings to modify divorce
decrees.
610 P.2d at 1300 (citation omitted).

This Court also held

that, where the District Court has refused to modify its
own earlier property distribution,
[tjhat determination, based on the [trial]
court's review of the facts and circumstances,
should not be overturned unless it results in
such manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. (citations omitted).

Thus, even the cases upon which

Dr. Miner relies require him to demonstrate a "manifest
injustice" in order to prevail in this appeal. This is a
burden that he simply cannot meet.

11

Both this Court's decision in Chandler v. West,
supra, and Dr. Miner in his Brief, rely upon this Court's
decision in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), in
which this Court was called upon to determine the circumstances under which a property distribution might be
modified.

While the property distribution in Land was based

upon a stipulation of the parties, the test enunciated by
this Court in that case has consistently been cited in
connection with the modification of property distributions
generally, without regard to whether they came about by
stipulation or, as in this case, by the decision of the
trial court. While recognizing the trial court's continuing
jurisdiction to modify a property distribution, this Court
was careful to point out that
the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the [trial] court where a
property settlement agreement has been
incorporated into the decree, and the
outright abrogation of the provisions
of such an agreement is only to be
resorted to with great reluctance and
for compelling reasons.
605 P.2d at 1251 (footnote citations omitted).
In this case, Dr. Miner simply failed to present
sufficient evidence to the trial court to justify the modification that he sought. He called no witnesses and he
proffered no testimony; therefore, the only evidence even
arguably before the trial court was his own Affidavit.
12

Yet

that Affidavit merely recites the fact that the IRS has indicated that it will deny a depreciation deduction for the
1981 tax year and that Dr. Miner fears that a similar fate
awaits deductions for the 1982 and 1983 tax years. The
Affidavit and its attachments are devoid of any reference
to a final determination by the IRS with respect to the 1981
tax year and, with respect to the 1982 and 1983 tax years,
the only information presented is Dr. Miner's speculation
and fear that the IRS may take similar action.

This extreme

weakness in Dr. Miner's "evidence" to the trial court was
pointed out at the hearing by Mrs. Miner's counsel
(R. at 597-98), yet Dr. Miner took no steps to remedy the
deficiency.

He cannot now complain that the trial court

failed to make the requisite findings to justify the
modification that he sought.
The Record simply fails to support either the
modification refused by the District Court or the reversal
of that refusal by this Court.

Dr. Miner failed to carry

his burden before the trial court and utterly fails in that
effort before this Court.

13

POINT H e

DR. MINER WAS BOUND BY THE PRIOR DENIAL OF HIS

MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SO AS TO DIVIDE
THE EQUITY EQUALLY.
The Supplemental Decree by which the District
Court originally divided the parties1 assets awarded to
Mrs. Miner an equity interest in the residence, which was
awarded to Dr. Miner, in the fixed amount of $67,500.00,
providing that it was to be paid with twelve percent
interest in four equal annual installments beginning June 1,
1985.

(Supplemental Decree, paragraph 14, R. at 401).

Dr. Miner took no appeal from that Decree.

Dr. Miner failed

to make the first payment when it became due.

The trial

court entered an Order providing that if the home awarded to
Dr. Miner were sold, all of the four annual payments would
become immediately due.

(Order, paragraph 3(b),

R. at 43 3.) Dr. Miner took no appeal.
Faced with Mrs. Miner's pending motion for the
entry of judgment with respect to the delinquent 1985 equity
payment (R. at 426), Dr. Miner moved to modify the original
property distribution so as to divide the equity in the
residence equally.

(Motion, R. at 438.)

The Commissioner

recommended (R. at 450), and the District Court ordered
(R. at 461-62) the denial of the motion.
appeal.
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Dr. Miner took no

In June of 1986, Dr. Miner, never having paid
the first equity installment, also became delinquent on the
second equity installment due to Mrs. Miner.

He filed

his second motion for modification, this time styling it as
a "Motion for Relief from Supplemental Decree."
(R. at 463-65.)

It was only upon the denial of this second

motion that Dr. Miner filed his appeal to this Court.
By his second motion, Dr. Miner sought precisely
the same relief that he had sought in his first motion from
which he filed no appeal.

In both motions, he sought to

modify the original fixed-sum equity awarded to Mrs. Miner
so as to divide the equity equally.

In both motions, he

relied upon the fact that he had moved to Texas and the
decline in the market value of the property and, in the
second, the alleged imposition of additional taxes. As
noted by the Trial Court, the move to Texas was "certainly
the choice" of Dr. Miner.

(Minute Entry, R. at 458.) As

discussed under Point I, above, the evidence produced with
respect to the alleged additional tax obligation is insufficient to justify modification.

The fact that the market

value of the property went down rather than up, also, does
not justify the modification of a fixed-amount equity
award:

Dr. Miner certainly would not have complained had

property values continued to rise as expected.

15

In any

event, a change in property value is to be anticipated,
particularly in today's real estate markets.
The significant fact is, however, that the
relief repeatedly sought by Dr. Miner is precisely the
same:

market conditions having changed, he would prefer to

receive an equal share of the equity resulting from the sale
of the residence occasioned by his move to Texas rather than
receiving merely the remaining equity after the payment of
the fixed amount due Mrs. Miner.

Having failed to appeal

the original denial of his motion, Dr. Miner should not now
be heard to complain of the denial of his second motion for
the same relief.

As this Court noted in Trego v. Trego,

565 P.2d 74 (Utah 1977):
When there has been an adjudication on
one set of facts, that should be res
adjudicata and there should be no modification unless some material change or
circumstance as would warrant doing so.
565 P.2d at 75. To the same effect is this Court's decision
in Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) and Anderson v.
Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962).
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The need for finality of judgments was similarly
emphasized by this Court in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74,
415 P.2d 662 (1966), in which it was held that it is inappropriate for a party whose motion has been once denied to reapply for the same relief.

In so holding, this Court wisely

noted that:
[I]f the party ruled against were
permitted to go beyond the rules, make
a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the
question arises, why should not the
other party who is now ruled against
be permitted to make a motion for rere-consideration, asking the court to
again reverse himself? Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in
motions, arguments and pressures and
theoretically a judge could go on
reversing himself periodically at the
entreaties of one or the other of the
parties ad infinitum.
415 P.2d at 663 (original emphasis).

These observations are

particularly appropriate to facts such as those presented by this
case in which every time Dr. Miner was confronted with another
delinquent annual equity installment, he moved for modification
of the Decree under which that obligation arose.

Such repeated

applications were appropriately rejected by the trial court.

17

POINT III, THE MODIFICATION SOUGHT BY DR. MINER WOULD BE UNFAIR
AND INEQUITABLE.
The modification sought by Dr. Miner would result in
the feared additional tax liability being paid out of the fixedsum equity interest originally awarded to Mrs. Miner.

The most

that can be said for such a modification is that it is an attempt
by Dr. Miner to pay a hypothetical joint liability from assets
awarded to Mrs. Miner.

In that regard, it truly seeks to compare

the proverbial "apples and oranges":

It seeks to pay their

supposed obligation with her assets.
The proposed modification is also unfair because it
was Dr. Miner who, without the knowledge or active consent of
Mrs. Miner, "invested" in the tax shelter now claimed by the IRS
to be a sham.

As set forth in Mrs. Miner"s Affidavit in

opposition to the motion for modification, it was Dr. Miner "who
made all financial decisions without explanation" to Mrs. Miner.
(Affidavit, paragraph 5, R. at 554, infra

at A-25.)

Dr. Miner

invested in the tax shelter in late December of 1981 as a general
partner and it was he who had the responsibility to determine the
advisability of that "investment."

(Id., R. at 554-55.)

Since

it was Dr. Miner who chose to make the "investment," it is unfair
that he should now seek to pay the supposed additional tax
liability from the assets awarded to Mrs. Miner.

18

Judge Conder wisely left it up to the IRS and the Tax
Court to determine, as between Dr. and Mrs. Miner, where should
rest the burden of any additional tax ultimately and finally
imposed by the IRS. Judge Conder, in ruling from the bench,
noted that he would "leave the tax return with the Internal
Revenue Service and let the chips fall where they may."
(Tr., R. at 602.)
Dr. Miner's request for modification was unfair.

It

was he who voluntarily chose to abandon the residence in Salt
Lake and move to Texas.

It was he who selected the tax shelter

claimed to be a sham by the IRS and it was he who selected the
accountant who allegedly made an error in addition.

Mrs. Miner's

interest in the equity of the residence was in a fixed amount;
had the value of the property gone up, Dr. Miner would certainly
have been entitled to resist any attempt by her to gain a larger
share than had originally been awarded.

The proposed modi-

fication is merely an attempt to pay an unliquidated joint
obligation out of the property distribution awarded to
Mrs. Miner.

The Trial Court properly denied the requested

modification.
CONCLUSION
Property settlements, as distinguished from alimony
and support awards, should be modified only with reluctance and
where the circumstances clearly necessitate modification.

In

this case, Dr. Miner presented no testimony and proffered no
19

evidence in support of his request for modification.

His

Affidavit and the attachments to it indicate merely that the IRS
may impose an additional tax for 1981. There was no final determination or adjudication to that effect. Under such circumstances, the evidence in support of the modification was
insufficient to justify it and it was properly denied.
Both times Dr. Miner was faced with a delinquent
annual equity installment, he moved the Court to modify the
Decree creating that obligation.
denied that motion.

Both times the trial court

Having failed to appeal from the first

denial, Dr. Miner should not now be permitted to complain of the
second denial.

Both motions sought precisely the same relief.

The modification sought by Dr. Miner was properly
rejected by the trial court because it was neither warranted by
nor fair under the circumstances.

At most, the potential

additional tax liability that the parties will face is a joint
obligation, whereas the proposed modification would pay that
joint obligation from assets awarded to Mrs. Miner (the equity in
the residence).

Since the tax shelter that may ultimately result

in an additional tax liability was selected by Dr. Miner without
consultation with Mrs. Miner, it is not fair that he should
impose their obligation upon her.

20

The trial court correctly refused to modify its
original property distribution and that carefully considered
refusal should be affirmed in all respects.

o
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ day of November,
1986.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
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of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
* * * * * * * *

'fit./!?

DOUGLAS LEE MINER,

VO.ZW

Plaintiff,
DECREE OP DIVORCE
v.
Civil No. D83-2353
Judge Dean E. Conder

CAROL JEAN MINER,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
pretrial conference with Commissioner Sandra Pueler presiding
on Friday, the 24th day of February, 1984. The plaintiff was
present in person and represented by counsel, David S.
Dolowit2.

The defendant was present in person and represented

by counsel, B. L. Dart.

The counsel advised the Commissioner

that all matters were in issue and would have to go to trial
but that counsel believed that it was in the best interest of
both parties and their children that the issue of terminating
the marriage be resolved immediately.

The Commissioner

determined that counsel was correct and referred the matter tc

A-2

the judge to whom this matter was assigned, The Honorable Dean
E. Conder.

Counsel for the parties appeared before Judge

Conder who determined to accept the request of the parties and
the recommendation of the Commissioner, heard the stipulations
of counsel and the parties and the testimony of each of the
parties and being advised thus in the premises and having
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1.

The parties are granted a decree of divorce, each

from the other, the same to become final upon entry.
2.

All remaining issues in this matter are reserved

for trial and there shall be no evidence or issue preclusion by
reason of the fact that the decree of divorce has been entered
in this matter.
3.

The court, on its own, directs and orders each of

the parties not to make any derogatory statement about the
other to or in front of the minor children of the parties.
4.

This matter shall be placed upon the trial

calendar so that the remaining issues can come before the court
for trial.
day of February, 1984Y,,

^

DEAN E\ CONDER, .
District Judge
ATTEST
H. DJXCW aiNCX-EY

~*~
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
Decree of Divorce
Civil No. D83-2583
Miner v. Miner

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
&
fot Plaintiff
/

B. L„ DART
Attorney for Defendant
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE" COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
* * * * * * * *

DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No, D-83-2353

CAROL JEAN MINER,

Judge Dean E. Conder

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the Court fo
trial on May 21 and May 22, 1984, the Honorable Dean E. Conde
presiding.

The plaintiff was present in person and represente

by counsel David S. Dolowitz.

The defendant was present i

person and represented by counsel B. L. Dart, Jr.

The Cour

T\eard and considered ttie testimony of each, of the parties an
the witnesses offered in their behalf, reviewed and considere
the exhibits accepted into evidence on behalf of each of th
parties, heard arguments of counsel and considered the lega
and factual arguments presented to the Court in written an

A-5
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oral form, after having previously granted a decree of divoro
to each of the parties and now being advised in the premise:
and having published its memorandum decision on the 5th day o
[June,

1984,

and

having

made

and

entered

its

supplementa

findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1*
of

Care, custody and control of the minor childre

the parties

is awarded

to the plaintiff,

their

father

subject to reasonable and liberal rights of visitation in th
defendant which visitation shall be for David and Krista, an
if they so desire, Barbara and Katie:
a.

Every other Saturday morning at 9:00 a.n

until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b#

Every other red letter holiday and the 24t

of July, with the exception of Mother's Day which shall alwa^
be spent with the defendant and Father's Day which shall alwa]
be spent with the plaintiff.
<:•

The

children

during the week as they

may

visit

with

their moth(

(the children) desire but they rau,

notify the plaintiff or his housekeeper that they are visiti
and must be home by dinner time.
d.

The defendant

shall have

the right

to

summer visitation period which shall not exceed two weeks a
this should be planned with the children to take into accou
their schedules.
-2A-6
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e.

The plaintiff shall have a right to take

summer trip with the children of at least two weeks duration.
f.

The defendant is admonished and requested t

plan meaningful activities with and for the children when the
are visiting with her.
g.

Barbara and Katie shall arrange such visita

tion with the defendant as they deem mutually desirable.
h.

All visitation between the defendant, Davi

and Krista shall be arranged so that David and Krista visit th
defendant together.
2.
and

Each of the parties to this matter, the plaintif

the defendant,

is enjoined

and

prohibited

from makin

derrogatory remarks about the other to the children about th
other parent.
3.

Each of the parties in this matter is enjoine

and prohibited from using the children to get back at the othe
parent.
4.

Neither party shall annoy, harass the other o

make physical contact with the other.
5.

The defendant

is enjoined

and prohibited

fro

going on or about the property at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lak
City, Utah except as incident to picking up or returning th
children from a visit when said visit is a regularly schedule
visit.

-3A-7
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6.

The defendant at this time is not ordered to pa

lany child support to the plaintiff for and on behalf of th
children.
7.

The

home

and

real

property

located

at

155

Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah is awarded to the plaintil
subject to the equitable interest of the defendant which sha]
I be paid as is hereinafter set out.
|

8.

The plaintiff

is awarded the Scout automobile

the furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances located :
the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, except <
are herein
account?

awarded

one-half

specifically
of

the

food

paintings? his gun collection?
equipment?

one-half

of

to

the

defendant,

storage?

his camera

the profit

sharing

one-half

his i:
of

tl

and photographic
account,

to-wi

$67,678 subject to the provisions for division of this accou
as

are

herein

set

out?

one-half

of

his

interest

in t

Geothermal tax shelter.
9.

All of the stock received by the plaintiff fr

his parents either before or during the marriage is awarded
him as his sole and separate property as said property is n
part of the marital estate.
10.

The defendant is awarded an equity interest

the home of the parties valued at $67,500 to be paid as
herein set out? the Honda automobile? the two bank accounts

-4A-8

First

Security

storage;

Bank

one-half

totalling

of

the

$5,637; one-half

paintings;

the

of

china,

the

crystal

foo
an

silverware; the sporting equipment and one-half of the profi
sharing

account

in

the

amount

of

$67,678

which

should

distributed as is hereinafter set forth and one-half

b

interes

of the parties in the Geothermal tax shelter.
11.
harmless
tions:
$4,480

The plaintiff is ordered to pay, assume and hoi

the defendant

from

the

following

debts

and

obliga

the debt to his father, A* 0. Miner, in the amount o
toward

the purchase of the home on Roxbury Road; th

VISA account; the Fort Douglas Account; the Deseret Foundatio
obligation and any and all sums due to his parents or family.
12.

Each of the parties is ordered to pay all debt

and obligations incurred by them since their separation.
13.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendan

alimony in the sum of $1,000 per month for 24 months commencin
with the month of June in 1984 and then the sum of $500 pe
month for 24 months after which time alimony shall terminate.
14.

The defendant's equity in the home shall be pai

in four annual installments of $16,875 principal plus accrue
interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance with the firs
payment

to be made on or before

June

1, 1985 and then eac

June 1 thereafter until the debt is paid in full.
this sum commences as of June 5, 1984.

-5A-9
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15.
the

sum of

The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendant
$67,678

(being

one-half

of

the profit

sharing

account) at the rate of $1,000 per month beginning June 1,
1988.

Payments are to be applied first to accrued interest

which shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum, and then the
balance to principal.

Interest shall accrue on this sum from

June 5, 1984.
16.

Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and

attorneys1 fees.
17.

Each

of

documents and carry

the

parties

is

ordered

out all steps necessary

to

sign

all

to effect

the

above-stated order.
DATED this 2 ^

day of

^-j^vx

t

, 1984.
11
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! A CONDER
DEAN E.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE ORDER OF THE COURT:

a

ATTEST
David S. Dolowitz
^^
Attorney for Plaintiff

B. L. Dart
Attorney for Defendant
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JUN 2 1 1985
B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff,

:
;

ORDER

v.

:

CAROL JEAN MINER,

:

Civil No. D83-2353

:

Judge Conder

Defendant.

oooOooo
Hearing on defendant's Motion for an Order
enforcing the terms of the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court on
the 31st day of May, 1985, at the hour Of 10:00 a.m., the
Honorable Commissioner Sandra Peuler presiding; plaintiff
appearing by and through his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and
defendant appearing in person and being represented by her
attorney, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., on behalf of B. L. Dart; and the
matter having been submitted and a recommendation having been
made, and the recommendation having not been accepted by

1

plaintiff and the matter having then come on for further hearing
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, and the Court having heard
arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the file in this
matter, and having an opportunity to have spoken with the minor
children of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
!•

The plaintiff is moving from the state of Utah on

the 22nd of June and the children have expressed a desire to have
visitation with the defendant but not prior to their move because
of their desire to say goodbye to their friends and attend
various social functions which have been planned by reason of
their move.

Because of this circumstance it is ordered that the

defendant's request for summer visitation from June 9, 1985 to
June 20, 1985 is denied, but for the summer of 1985 defendant is
awarded visitation for a two week period during the month of
August at defendant's option with defendant to notify plaintiff
by the 15th of July of the two week period of time she desires
summer visitation*
As a further order, each of the parties shall be
obligated to pay one-half of the transportation expenses of the
children from the state of Texas to and from the state of Utah or
the state of California whichever of the latter two states

2
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defendant elects as the state where she desires to exercise her
summer visitation for 1985•
2.

Defendant has waived any claim she might have in

the food storage and plaintiff is hereby awarded all of the
paintings of the parties pursuant to an agreement of the parties
in exchange for a modification of the Decree of Divorce as it
relates to alimony and is hereinafter provided.
3*

Defendant is hereby awarded, in addition to the

alimony provided in the original Decree of Divorce, an award of
alimony from plaintiff of 18 installments in the amount of $500
each, which alimony shall not terminate upon the remarriage of
defendant but shall terminate upon defendant's death as to any
installments which have not yet come c|ue at the time of her
death.
Payment of these installments of alimony shall be
on a monthly basis commencing with the month of June, 1986, with
payments to be paid on or before the 2Dth day of the month in
which due, except that there will be an acceleration of the due
date of the installments upon the happening of the following
events:
a.

In the event defendant does remarry so that

her alimony obligation created under tfce Decree of Divorce is
terminated, then plaintiff's obligation for the payment of these

3
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installments shall be accelerated so that commencing with the
month following the termination of alimony under the original
Decree of Divorce, plaintiff shall pay to defendant two (2)
installments each month to be paid by the 20th day of the month
until all installments have been paid.
b.

In the event of the sale of the house of the

house and real property at 1522 Roxbury Road by plaintiff, all of
the installments shall become immediately due and shall
constitute a lien against said house and real property until
paid.
4.

The plaintiff shall pay to defendant within thirty

days the balance owing on the savings accounts awarded to
defendant in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce heretofore
entered, in the sum of $1,387 together with interest at the rate
of ten percent per annum.

In the event plaintiff does not pay to

defendant the balance owing on said savings accounts, together with
interest, within thirty days then judgment in said sum shall enter
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.
5.

The plaintiff has no documents relating to stock

in Geothermal, and he has been unable to obtain these documents.
The plaintiff shall cooperate in all ways necessary to enable the
defendant to obtain docouments relating to the stock in Geothermal.

4
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6.

Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in connection

with this proceeding in the sum of $150.
DATED

this

*~ /

day of June, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

DEAN EQ CONDER
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
ATTfcST

APPROVAL AS TO FORM

DAVID S . DOLOWITZ

5
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ^-dd^l^Wu^-3"^

'

of and for

Li
•VL=*^5g^
Qfe

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIKEg
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, DT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
MOTION
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. D83-2353
Judge Dean Conder

CAROL JEAN MINER,
Defendant.

* * * * * * *

Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter hereby moves
the above-entitled court to modify the provisions of the Decree
of Divorce on file herein, to provide that the home acquired by
the parties on Roxbury Road, in Salt Lake City, Utah, be sold
and the net proceeds of sale be divided equally between the
parties, that the provisions of the Decree of Divorce which
required the plaintiff to pay the defendant for her interest in
the home be vacated and this modification be effected on the
grounds that at the time the court made its Decree, the
plaintiff intended to live in the home and raise the children

A-16

of the parties in the home, but he has now been required, as a
result of a change in employment, to move to the state of
Texas, that the home is for sale, that he has been required to
purchase a home in Texas, and is presently making payments on
both the Salt Lake City home (to preserve the equity of both of
the parties) and the home in Texas for himself and the children
of the parties, and it is thus fair and equitable to modify the
Decree of Divorce to require a simple division of the equity of
the parties in the home rather than require the plaintiff to
make payments to the defendant.
DATED this

S

7

—

day of July, 1985.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the
following on this

3~

day of July, 1985:

Mr. B. L. Dart
Attorney at Law
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
7653A
-2A-17
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FILEO IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County 'J*a>i

SEP2^^

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101
(801) 521-6383

Dtputy CVH

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo-—
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff,

:
:

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR MODIFICATION

v.

:

CAROL JEAN MINER,

:

Civil No. D83-2353

:

Judge Conder

Defendant.

oooOooo
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce by
modifying defendant's entitlement to receive payments on her
interest in the residence of the parties came on regularly for
hearing on the 20th day of August, 1985, plaintiff by his
attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing by her
attorney, B. L. Dart, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings
and having heard arguments, finds that the changes of plaintiff
in his professional work and move from Utah to Texas were
voluntary and are not legally sufficient to justify a
modification of the Decree of Divorce, and the Court being fully
advised,
1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That plaintiff's Motion for Modification is hereby
denied.
DATED this 2>«5

day of Ati^^st, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

\mm<**-

DISTRICT JDDGE
APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FILE0 IM 01 roles OFHCE

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

DOUGLAS LEE MINER,

)
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
) JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
V.

)

) Civil No. D83-2353
) Judge Dean E. Conder

CAROL JEAN MINER,
Defendant.

)
* * * * * * *

Plaintiff hereby moves the above-entitled court,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and, based on the court's continuing
jurisdiction under the provisions of S 30-3-5, UTAH CODE ANN.
(1953) to amend the Decree of Divorce made and entered herein
on August

23, 1984,

in particular,

paragraphs

10 and 14

thereof, wherein the court determined that the equity of the
parties in their home, $135,900.00, should be divided equally
between them and that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant
the sum of $67,500.00 over four years in four installments at
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interest on the grounds that the home was valued by the court
at $235,000.00, but that the home, when sold by the plaintiff,
produced a gross selling price of $215,000.00 and a net sales
price of approximately $202,100.00; that is approximately
$33,000.00 less than the court ruled, and on the further groun<
that the Geothermal Partnership which the court divided equally
between the parties has been disallowed for tax purposes by th<
Internal Revenue Service for the tax year 1981 which has
produced a claim against the parties for the sum of $20,767.15
in 1981 and an additional claim for interest penalty that will
have to be paid after all the other taxes are paid as a penalty
which will be in the approximate sum of $19,000.00, but which
sum cannot be fully determined until the taxes for that year
are paid and an additional tax in 1982 in the approximate sum
of $10,584.69, which sum cannot be fully determined until that
tax is paid, incurred as a result of an accounting error in the
preparation of the 1982 taxes by the accounting firm, plus
interest penalty that cannot be determined until the taxes,
interest and penalty are paid.

In addition, plaintiff

anticipates additional assessments of taxes, interest and
penalty for 1982 and 1983, based on the disallowance of the
Geothermal Partnership of approximately $10,000.00.
Plaintiff specifically moves the court to amend the
decree by vacating the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 14 of

-2A-21
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the Decree and to vacate the judgment for $24,975.00 plus
interest at 12 percent entered on August 25, 1985 as
enforcement by this court of the provisions of paragraphs 10
and 14 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and after vacating all
those provisions, require that the parties use the proceeds of
sale from their home, first to pay all taxes due for the tax
years 1981, 1982 and 1983, and, thereafter, to divide the net
proceeds of sale equally between the parties.
All supporting documents are attached to the
memorandum in support of this motion, except plaintiff's
accountant's worksheets demonstrating the scope of the tax
liability and those are attached hereto.

u^
DATED this

0

T — day of

V ^ ^ J ? , 1986.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff

-3A-22
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•MJttCTTg CERTIFICATE

y

A

*

I hereby certify that I caused to be wailed; yubLaye
prcpa-id, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the
following on this

If

day of

H&~-*

, 1986:

Mr. B. L. Dart
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

9991A
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4?uPH , 8B

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-—oooOooo
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION AND IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROL JEAN MINER,

Civil No. ~D8-5-2353>

Defendant.

Judge Dean E. Conder
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

Carol Miner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is the defendant in the above-captioned

2.

Defendant has spoken with the children and

action.

tentatively arranged with them for summer visitation in 1986 from
the 1st of August to the 14th of August.

It is her desire that

the Court set down these dates as her visitation entitlement
dates under the same provisions which the Court ordered last year
providing that each of the parties bear one-half of the

1
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transportation costs between the children's home in Texas and the
plaintiff's home in California.
3.

During the period since the entry of the Decree of

Divorce, plaintiff has been chronically late on his payments of
alimony and at the present time has not made the May installment.
It is defendant's desire that the Court specify a date certain in
each month when the alimony is due so that there can be no
question of when defendant is entitled to the alimony*

In respect

to this request, defendant asks the Court to set the payment date
as the 5th of the month for which the alimony is due.
4.

The Decree of Divorce was modified by stipulation

in May of 1985 where it was provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
Order that defendant's claim to paintings would be waived and
those paintings would be awarded to plaintiff.

Concurrently,

defendant was awarded from plaintiff, an alimony award of $500 a
month for 18 installments, a total of $9,000*

Under the

provisions of paragraph 3b, it was provided that in the event of
the sale of the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, all the installments
would become immediately due and by reason of the sale, which has
now occurred, defendant desires that she be awarded a judgment
for all 18 installments with the money to be paid out of the
proceeds of sale.
5.

During the marriage of the parties, plaintiff was

the party who made all financial decisions without explanation to
defendant.

This included the investment which was made by
2
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plaintiff in December of 1981 in the Geothermal Partners II*
Plaintiff made this investment it now appears as a general
partner under circumstances where he had the responsibility to
determine the advisability of this investment.
If in fact there are now assessments being made
based on disallowance by the IRS of certain deductions, then the
cost of those should be borne by the plaintiff since while it is
true defendant signed tax returns, she was not knowledgeable as
to plaintiff's activities and simply followed plaintiff's
instructions as to the signing of the tax returns each year which
had been prepared by accountants retained by plaintiff.
6.

From the documentation provided by plaintiff, it

appears that some of the claimed deductions which the IRS is
electing to disallow arose out of income sources not declared in
1982 which may well relate to assets awarded to plaintiff and not
awarded as marital assets, such as the $150,000 in stocks the
Court awarded to him as a non-marital asset.

It also appears

that some of the deductions which the IRS is currently
disallowing may be carried forward and deductible in later years.
At this time it is impossible to tell what the full tax
ramification and impact of the action by the IRS is.
It further appears that plaintiff has received
from the IRS communications and correspondence relating to the
disallowance of certain expenses in 1981 and 1982. Defendant has

3
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received no information from plaintiff and has not been in a
position where she could adequately protect herself, and to now
make her responsible for not only the tax liability but the
penalties and interest which have accrued would be unfair and
inappropriate.

It is submitted that the relative rights and

responsibilities between the parties with respect to the claims
of the IRS should be litigated through the tax courts and the
ultimate determination by the tax courts should be dispositive.
This Court should refuse to grant plaintiff's Motion in this
proceeding and allow the tax courts to make the final
determination.
7.

It has been necessary for defendant to retain an

attorney to represent her in the defense of the Motions filed by
plaintiff in this proceeding and defendant, who is without any
current employment or independent source of income, is in need of
the Court to award her attorney's fees in this proceeding.
DATED this 11th day of June, 1986.

CAROL JEAN MINER
\<f

}

'S

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of

June, 1986.
M r

Cbmraission expires:

NOTARYi PUBLIC^ J
Y
Re/sidi/ng at Sa£t Lake Coun

4
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

//

day of June, 1986, I

hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing Affidavit to:
David S. Dolowitz
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State, 7th floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for plaintiff.
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FILED IN CLERICS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

I

JUN 24 1986
B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 )
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant
310 South Main
S u i t e 1330
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

tmtouft

H.Dtxi

a

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DOUGLAS LEE MINER,
Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

• •

:

CAROL JEAN MINER,

:

C i v i l No. D83-2353

:

Judge Conder

Defendant*

oooOooo
Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From Judgment and
Defendant's Motion For Enforcement of Terms of Decree of Divorce
and For Clarification or Alternatively For Amendment of the
Decree of Divorce both came on regularly for hearing by
stipulation on Thursday, the 12th day of June, 1986, at the hour
of 8:00 a.m., plaintiff being represented by his attorney David
S. Dolowitz and defendant appearing in person and represented by
her attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court having heard the arguments
of the respective counsel and certain matters having been
stipulated and the Court having considered the arguments and the
stipulations and being fully advised,

A-29

to*

5'

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendant shall have the right to have the minor

children with her from the 1st of August to the 14th of August.
The childrens1 desires are to be considered insofar as there may
be any conflict with prior existing commitments*

The cost of

transportation between plaintiff's home in Texas and defendant's
home in California shall be divided with defendant to pay the
cost of transporting the children to California and plaintiff to
pay the cost of transporting the children back to Texas•
2.

Pursuant to stipulation, it is established that

plaintiff's payments to defendant of alimony shall be due on the
fifth day of each month for which the alimony is due and should
be paid henceforth through the clerk of the District Court of
Salt Lake County,
3.

Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce

to change the equity entitlements of the parties in the house and
real property at 1522 South Roxbury Road by vacating the
provisions of paragraphs 10 and 14 of the Decree of Divorce and
to vacate the currently outstanding judgment for $24,975, plus
interest at 12 percent (12%) entered on August 25, 1985, is
denied.

Plaintiiff's Motion that the parties use the proceeds of

sale from said house and real property first to pay all taxes due
for tax years 1981, 1982, and 1983 and thereafter to divide the
net proceeds of sale equally between the parties is denied.
2
A-30

:\

'

t-^*^

4.

Defendant's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce

to a c c e l e r a t e payments by p l a i n t i f f t o defendant beyond those
o r i g i n a l l y provided in the Decree of Divorce i s d e n i e d .
5.

Defendant's request for attorney1 s f e e s i s

denied,

each p a r t y t o b e a r t h e i r own a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o s t s *
DATED t h i s

3-Y

day of June,

1986.

BY THE COURT:

DEAN E. CONDER
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

ATTEST
H.CSXC
Deputy C!s

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

a

day of June, 1986,

I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to:
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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